Australia sits at a junction few countries face so starkly. It is a wealthy, energy-rich nation with an abundance of sunshine, wind and land that could power a clean energy revolution. It is also one of the world’s largest exporters of fossil fuels – coal and liquefied natural gas (LNG) – industries that deliver huge fiscal benefits and regional jobs but that also write large numbers into the global carbon ledger. Since the Labor government under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese took office in May 2022, Canberra has promised ambitious climate targets while simultaneously signing off on a raft of coal and gas projects. The contradiction between climate rhetoric and approvals has provoked outrage from environmentalists, unease from voting constituencies in mining regions, and confusion among international partners.
This post walks through the facts, the figures, and the stakes. How many coal and gas projects have been approved since 2022? What are their lifetime emissions – including the often-overlooked Scope 3 emissions from combustion offshore? How do those emissions compare to Australia’s domestic output and the world’s total greenhouse gases? Finally, what do these approvals mean for Australia’s politics, for the climate, and for the future of its economy? My aim here is to be thorough, pragmatic and compelling: Australia cannot be both a fossil-fuel export powerhouse and a credible climate leader. The choices made now will reverberate for decades.
A quick note on numbers and framing: different organisations and reports use different methodologies. The project counts and emissions totals I reference below are those most commonly cited by environmental groups and by analysts tracking approvals since May 2022. Where exact numbers vary, I flag that uncertainty. The key point is the scale and the direction of travel – large, export-oriented fossil projects that lock in emissions for decades.
The political backdrop: promises, pragmatism, and pressure
The 2022 federal election brought Labor to power with a mandate to be more ambitious on climate policy than the Coalition had been. Labor campaigned on becoming a “renewable energy superpower,” pledged a 43% emissions reduction on 2005 levels by 2030, and committed to net-zero by 2050 – positions that aligned with growing public concern about heatwaves, floods and bushfires.
But governing forced realpolitik. Australia’s economy and many regional communities rely on mining royalties, export revenues and well-paid mining jobs. Energy security concerns – heightened by global price shocks after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – drove arguments for continuing gas production to supply both domestic and international markets. Labor has had to balance its climate agenda with union influences, regional electoral realities and economic arguments about revenue and baseload energy.
The result has been a mixed record: bold steps in renewable support and emissions policy on one hand, and a steady stream of fossil fuel approvals on the other. For critics, this is hypocrisy; for defenders, it’s a “just transition” approach that tries to avoid abandoning regions and workers before alternatives are ready. Understanding the approvals comes from seeing this tension: a government trying to hold two incompatible agendas together.
Counting approvals: how many coal and gas projects?
Since Labor took office, a significant number of fossil projects have been approved under federal and state processes. A useful way to think about this is in two categories:
• Coal projects: analyses tracking approvals put the tally of coal projects approved since May 2022 at around a dozen – including new mines and extensions or expansions of existing sites. Some of these approvals extend lives of existing operations, increase annual production limits, or greenlight new pit developments. Examples cited frequently in reporting include expansions in Queensland’s Bowen Basin and approvals that extend mining windows in New South Wales’ coal regions.
• Natural gas projects: roughly nine gas projects (offshore and onshore) have been approved in the same period, again a mix of greenfield developments and capacity expansions or permit extensions. These include LNG-related offshore projects and basin developments that underpin Australia’s position as a major global LNG supplier.
When broader fossil fuels are counted (coal, gas and oil), the total of approvals tracked by some watchdogs reaches about 31 projects since 2022. Of those, roughly seven are identified as wholly new projects, while some two dozen are expansions or life-extensions. The net effect of expansions is almost identical to new projects in climate terms: more fossil production exported or burned, and more emissions locked in over decades.
These approvals came through different channels – federal environmental assessments under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act, state planning approvals, and resource permits. Critics argue that impact assessments often insufficiently weight cumulative climate impacts and that offset requirements are weak. Supporters counter that projects are assessed on their local environmental impacts and economic merit, and that many conditions are attached to approvals.
Unpacking emissions: Scope 1, 2 and 3, and the lifetime footprint
To understand the climate impact of these projects, we must look beyond mine-site pollution. Emissions are best thought of across three scopes:
• Scope 1: direct emissions from extraction and onsite operations – e.g., diesel fuel combustion, fugitive methane during gas production, process emissions.
• Scope 2: indirect emissions from purchased energy used to operate sites – e.g., electricity drawn from a fossil-heavy grid.
• Scope 3: all other upstream and downstream emissions, most crucially the CO2 emitted when exported coal or gas is burned by power stations, steelworks or factories abroad.
Scope 3 emissions are frequently the largest share for exported fossil fuels, yet are often omitted from domestic national inventories because they occur overseas. For the climate, however, the location of combustion is immaterial.
Analyses tracking the projects approved under Labor since 2022 estimate lifetime emissions (across scopes, including downstream combustion) exceeding 6.5 billion tonnes (6.5 gigatonnes) of CO2?equivalent. To put that in perspective: Australia’s total annual national greenhouse gas emissions are on the order of 440 million tonnes (0.44 Gt CO2?e). That 6.5 Gt figure therefore represents roughly 15 years of Australia’s current annual emissions – all locked in by decisions made in just a few years.
Breaking that 6.5 Gt number down further: one analysis focusing on a subset of major coal approvals calculated lifetime emissions for 11 coal projects at about 1.677 billion tonnes (1.68 Gt CO2). Gas projects – whose climate damage is magnified by methane leakage – add substantially to the total. Direct emissions from the newly approved projects in a single future year such as 2035 have been projected at around 12.8 million tonnes CO2?e, reducing to 9.8 million tonnes if the projects deliver planned abatement measures such as carbon capture. But that annual figure is misleading; the true damage lies in the cumulative lifetime emissions released when exported fuels are burned.
A few technical caveats: emission estimates depend on fuel quality, combustion efficiency, assumed methane leakage rates, and projected production lifetimes. If global demand softens and production volumes fall, realised emissions could be lower. Conversely, if projects run longer or leak more methane than expected, the emissions could be higher. The conservative assumption for climate planning should therefore be to count the full lifecycle emissions as if production and combustion proceed as planned.
How these approvals compare to Australia’s domestic emissions
The comparison that helps the scale sink in is this: the 6.5 Gt of lifetime emissions from these approvals equates to around 15 years of Australia’s annual emissions at current levels. Another way to frame it: if those fuels are exported and burned, they will generate more greenhouse gases than a decade and a half of current national activity.
This exposes an uncomfortable policy contradiction. Domestically, Australia has been investing in emissions reductions – expanding renewables, supporting storage and grid upgrades, and tightening large-emitter rules. Yet, by approving new fossil production for export, the country is effectively exporting its emissions problem. Those overseas emissions undermine the global effort to cut greenhouse gases and, in time, will worsen climate impacts that hit Australian communities – sea level rise for Pacific neighbours and Australia’s northern coastline, more intense heatwaves and bushfire risk inland, and changes in rainfall patterns affecting agriculture.
Australia’s per capita emissions are already high compared to many countries. The country’s industry mix, large distances, and export profile make it energy-intensive. Locking in billions of tonnes of exports raises the bar for domestic reductions and complicates the country’s ability to credibly argue it is doing its fair share on climate.
Putting it in a global context
Globally, annual greenhouse gas emissions are on the order of 50–55 billion tonnes CO2?equivalent. The projects approved under Labor, taken as a single lump sum of ~6.5 Gt, represent an amount equal to roughly 12–13% of a single year of global emissions – or about one-eighth. That is a strikingly large figure to be committed to by decisions in a single country over a few years.
If other major fossil-exporting nations pursued the same path, the cumulative effect would make the goals of the Paris Agreement – especially limiting warming to 1.5°C – effectively unattainable. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is unequivocal: emissions must peak as soon as possible and fall rapidly to keep warming to 1.5°C. New long-lived fossil infrastructure is fundamentally incompatible with that pathway.
Australia’s exports therefore are not a local policy quirk; they have global consequences. That global impact spills back to Australia politically and economically: trade partners, climate-vulnerable neighbours and international investors watch closely and reassess relationships when countries double-down on high-carbon exports.
Environmental and social impacts beyond the carbon numbers
Numbers alone can be abstract. On the ground, fossil projects reshape landscapes, waterways and communities.
• Ecosystems: Open-cut coal mines create enormous scars on landscapes, remove topsoil and disrupt migration and breeding habitats for native species. Australia’s unique fauna – koalas, gliders, wallabies and many bird species – can lose critical habitat. Mining near the Great Barrier Reef and its catchment raises concern about sediment and runoff worsening reef health.
• Water: Coal mining often involves dewatering operations that lower local aquifers. Fracking and some gas developments use large volumes of water and risk contamination if wells fail or chemicals migrate into groundwater. For farmers and regional towns reliant on aquifers, this is a long-term risk.
• Air and health: Dust from mines, emissions from processing plants and increased truck traffic degrade air quality. Studies in mining regions link particulate pollution to respiratory problems and other health issues.
• Indigenous and cultural impacts: Many proposed or expanded projects overlap with lands of Indigenous communities. Even where formal consultation occurs, outcomes often leave traditional owners opposing developments that threaten sacred sites and cultural landscapes.
• Socioeconomic impacts: Mining towns can boom and bust. While mines create high-paying jobs, they often bring a transient workforce, housing pressures and social stresses. When mines eventually close – possibly sooner than planned if demand weakens – communities can be left with limited long-term prospects.
Methane’s outsized role in gas projects
Natural gas is often argued to be a bridge fuel, cleaner than coal when combusted. That logic focuses on CO2 from combustion. But it omits fugitive methane emissions during production, processing and transport. Methane is a far more potent greenhouse gas than CO2 over short timeframes – roughly 80 times more powerful over 20 years – so even small leakage rates can erase the supposed advantage of gas over coal in the near term. For climate targets centred on rapid near-term reductions, methane leakage is a critical problem. Robust monitoring, strict regulation and cutting leakage rates are essential – but many analysts worry that the rapid expansion of gas projects will outpace effective mitigation.
Economic arguments: jobs, revenue and stranded-asset risk
Proponents of new coal and gas argue from immediate economic reality: fossil exports generate tens of billions of dollars per year in export revenue, support regional economies and provide high-wage jobs. For states such as Queensland and Western Australia, royalties from mining and gas make a material contribution to public finances. Supporters say that permitting new projects under stringent environmental conditions funds the energy transition and secures a gradual shift for workers.
Yet this case is weakening under several pressures:
• Renewables are now often the cheapest source of new power generation. Investment costs for solar and wind have fallen dramatically in the last decade, and storage costs are falling too. Regions that invest in renewables, storage and digital grids can build durable local economies without fossil exposure.
• Job transition is feasible: modelling shows that deployment of renewables, storage and electrification can create many new jobs – often more than the number of jobs lost in fossil sectors – but these jobs may be in different places and require new skills. A truly “just transition” needs active policy: retraining, regional investment, and social supports.
• Stranded-asset risk: as major economies tighten climate policy, demand for coal and high-carbon products could fall rapidly. Investors are increasingly considering climate risk; some large institutional investors have divested from coal or from certain oil and gas ventures. Infrastructure built today could become economically worthless long before its engineering life ends if markets and policy shift.
• Trade risks: policies such as the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism are designed to penalise carbon-intensive imports, which could disadvantage Australian exporters with high embedded emissions. This makes the economic calculus more complex than simply counting royalties.
Political fallout and international credibility
Domestically, the approvals have widened political divides. Environmental groups and climate-focused independents accuse Labor of betraying its climate promise. The Coalition paints Labor as weak or incoherent on energy. In regional electorates, however, the calculus can be different: jobs and local investment matter. Labor’s political challenge is to reconcile these competing demands: to be seen to support regional livelihoods while aligning national policy with international climate commitments.
Internationally, Australia’s approvals affect its credibility in climate diplomacy. Pacific island nations – among the countries most vulnerable to sea-level rise and climate change – have been vocal in urging major emitters to do more. Australia’s continued role as a major fossil exporter complicates its ability to hold moral authority on climate issues. Global climate forums increasingly focus attention on exporters who continue to expand fossil capacity.
Pathways forward: policy options and practical steps
The way forward requires policy coherence, realistic timelines and active programs to support affected communities. Key policy levers include:
• Tightening approval standards: require full lifecycle emissions analyses (including Scope 3), consider cumulative impacts, and apply stricter thresholds for new fossil approvals consistent with a 1.5°C pathway.
• Moratoria and phase-down schedules: placing temporary or permanent limits on new high-emission projects while building alternative economic pathways.
• Incentivising renewables and storage: accelerate grid upgrades, fast-track transmission, and support deployment of utility-scale and distributed renewables. Programs like large-scale battery tenders and pumped hydro development should be prioritised.
• Real just-transition programs: comprehensive retraining, income support and place-based economic development for towns facing mine closures.
• Carbon management and methane reduction: where gas remains necessary in the near term, aggressively enforce methane monitoring and mitigation, and invest in carbon capture only as one tool among many – with realistic expectations about scale, cost and timelines.
• Economic diversification: invest export revenue into sovereign wealth-style funds, green industrial policy (green hydrogen, critical minerals processing, manufacturing for renewables), and community-led redevelopment of mine sites (solar farms, tourism, ecosystems restoration).
Case studies and contrasts
Looking at local projects helps ground the abstract numbers. Projects such as mine extensions in the Bowen Basin or basin-wide gas development proposals like Beetaloo have catalysed protests, cultural heritage disputes and court challenges. Earlier controversies – the long-running fight over the Adani/Carmichael mine – provide lessons in social license, the limits of offsets, and how protracted conflict can sap political capital and investor willingness.
On the positive side, Australia already has success stories in the energy transition. Rooftop solar adoption is among the highest per capita in the world, with millions of households generating their own power. South Australia has demonstrated high penetration of renewables paired with storage and interstate interconnectors, proving that variable renewables can be managed at scale. The Snowy 2.0 pumped hydro project and green hydrogen pilot initiatives show pathways to export clean energy or produce low-carbon industrial inputs. These examples illustrate that alternatives to fossil-export dependency are technically feasible.
Ethics, equity and global responsibility
Beyond technical and economic arguments is a moral dimension. Australia is a wealthy nation with high historical per-capita emissions and strong per-capita resource wealth. There is an ethical argument that Australia ought to lead the transition away from fuels whose combustion destabilises the climate system and disproportionately harms low-income nations and vulnerable communities. Continuing to expand fossil exports when alternatives exist can be framed as an inequitable global action: the benefits accrue locally and in the near term, while harms are globally distributed and long-term.
What individuals and communities can do
For readers worried about these approvals, there are practical actions:
• Engage politically: vote, contact MPs, attend town halls and make climate concerns part of the political conversation.
• Support a just transition: press for policies and funds that support retraining and regional investment rather than only propping up fossil jobs.
• Reduce personal emissions: electrify transport and heating where possible, invest in efficiency, and consider rooftop solar and storage.
• Support credible advocacy groups, local land care, and legal challenges where environmental assessment processes are weak.
• Back businesses committed to low-carbon supply chains and encourage employers to adopt ambitious net-zero plans.
Conclusion: a crossroads with consequences
The approvals of coal and gas projects under the current government – whether counted as 21 projects in coal and gas or as part of a larger tally of ~31 fossil approvals – are more than a policy detail. They are strategic choices that lock in emissions, shape regional futures, and determine Australia’s role in a warming world. The estimated 6.5 billion tonnes of CO2?equivalent lifetime emissions tied to these projects is a stark figure: roughly 15 years of Australia’s present domestic emissions and the equivalent of over 12% of global annual emissions in a single lump-sum.
Those numbers should force a national conversation about priorities. Australia has the technological capability, the renewable resources and the capital to pivot hard toward a low-carbon future. But that pivot requires political courage: to say no to projects whose lifetimes are inconsistent with global climate limits, to invest the proceeds of transition into communities, and to reimagine regional economies around sustainable industries.
If Australia chooses the path of maximal fossil development in pursuit of short-term revenue, it risks economic and reputational costs in a decarbonising world. If it chooses the path of rapid, managed transition, it can claim a leadership role, protecting its people and exporting the technologies and services the world will need. The choice the Albanese government – and the Australian electorate – make now will be written into the climate ledger for generations.
If you care about this issue, make your voice heard. Ask your representatives how they will reconcile approvals with the 2030 and 2050 targets. Demand transparency on lifecycle emissions in project assessments. Support policies that fund genuine, place-based transition programs for workers and communities. And support the development of renewables, storage and green exports that promise long-term, equitable prosperity rather than short-term carbon debts.
The road forward is hard, but the alternative – a future shaped by increasingly extreme climate impacts – is far worse. Australia can be a model for a wealthy, resource-rich country choosing durability over fossil lock-in. But that requires shifting the political economy today, not after the damages compound. The stakes are planetary, but the decision sits squarely in national hands.
