Liberty Leading the People, by Eugène Delacroix

Victor Hugo’s last novel, Quatrevingt-treize (Ninety-Three), published in 1874, makes one of the boldest claims about history ever lodged inside a work of fiction. The French Revolution, its narrator insists, was not something that men did. It was something that happened to them, and through them, as the tide happens to the waves that ride upon it. “To ascribe the Revolution to men,” Hugo writes, “is to ascribe the tide to the waves.” Read at full stretch, the book argues that the drive toward equality, and with it the wider revolutionary trinity of liberty, equality and fraternity, is a force of historical necessity: something closer to a natural process than to a human choice.

That is an extraordinary thing to believe about the year of the Terror, and Hugo believed it with his eyes open. This essay does three things with the claim. It reads it carefully, because the tide metaphor is more precise, and more morally complicated, than its reputation suggests. It tests it against the history the novel fictionalises, above all the western wars that Hugo gathered under the name of the Vendée. And it asks whether the two centuries since give Hugo’s confidence any warrant, once we set beside it the later upheavals that have been compared to 1789 and the reactions that followed them. My argument is that Hugo’s Necessity is best understood as an interpretive stance rather than a law of history. As a description of the long direction of travel in formal equality and material welfare, it is defensible, though only with heavy qualification. As a prediction about any particular election, decade or country, it is worthless. And as a moral doctrine it would be dangerous if the novel did not carry its own corrective. Hugo saw the danger, and the ending of the book is his answer to it.

To see why the metaphor took the shape it did, it helps to remember who was holding the pen. Hugo had spent almost nineteen years in exile after denouncing Louis-Napoléon’s coup of December 1851, and he returned to France only when the Second Empire collapsed in 1870. He came home to catastrophe: defeat by Prussia, the siege of Paris, and then, in the spring of 1871, the Commune and its drowning in blood during the Bloody Week of May, when thousands of Communards were killed. Hugo was no partisan of the Commune’s methods, yet he defended the right of the defeated to shelter, offered his own house in Brussels to fugitives, and was expelled from Belgium for his trouble. He wrote Ninety-Three largely on Guernsey in 1872 and 1873, while the Third Republic was still a provisional and precarious thing, its Assembly dominated by monarchists who would happily have seen the Revolution repudiated altogether.

A committed republican, then, chose to write about the one year in which the Republic had been most terrible. He did not do so to excuse it, and he did not do so to condemn it. He did so to set it inside a larger frame, in which the visible horrors of 1793, the executions, the civil war, the fanaticism on every side, are scaffolding around an invisible and ultimately progressive work. His image for this is the Convention as both furnace and forge: a place of heat and chaos from which nonetheless come lasting rays of justice, tolerance, goodness, right, truth and love. In the narrator’s account the assembly abolishes slavery, expands education and proclaims civic responsibility, principles that outlast the violence that attended them. The novel is an act of historical consolation addressed to a generation tempted to conclude that the price had been too high.

Hugo had used the ocean as his figure for the people long before this book, in his poetry, in Les Misérables, in Toilers of the Sea and in his political writings. In Ninety-Three the figure hardens into a theory of causation. In the Paris section, as he describes the Convention, he writes:

Imputer la révolution aux hommes, c’est imputer la marée aux flots.

La révolution est une action de l’Inconnu.

Appelez-la bonne action ou mauvaise action, selon que vous aspirez à l’avenir ou au passé, mais laissez-la à celui qui l’a faite.

Elle semble l’œuvre en commun des grands événements et des grands individus mêlés, mais elle est en réalité la résultante des événements.

Les événements dépensent, les hommes payent. Les événements dictent, les hommes signent.

In English, the passage says that to blame the Revolution on men is to blame the tide on the waves; that the Revolution is an act of the Unknown; that it may be called a good deed or a bad one according to whether one aspires to the future or to the past, but that it should be left to the one who did it; that it seems the joint work of great events and great individuals intermingled, though it is in truth the product of events; and that events spend while men pay, events dictate while men sign.

The metaphor is exact. Waves are the visible surface of the sea. They have names, shapes and moments, and they appear to be responsible for what they do. The tide is the deeper movement, gravitational and patient, which no single wave begins or ends. Desmoulins, Danton, Marat and Robespierre are the waves: vivid, nameable, apparently the authors of events. In Hugo’s further image they are clerks who sign pages whose true author is God behind the mask of Destiny. The Revolution is, in his phrase, a form of the immanent phenomenon that we call Necessity.

The novel prepares this statement long before it makes it. The whole first part takes place at sea, where the royalist corvette Claymore is driven by wind and current toward the Minquiers reefs and is nearly destroyed by one of its own cannon, broken loose from its moorings and rampaging across the gun deck like a captive beast. The cannon is a figure of uncontrolled force, and the scene is also a small parable of human responsibility: Lantenac, the old marquis who is the book’s royalist commander, decorates the gunner for the courage with which the loose gun is finally caught, and then orders him shot for the negligence that let it loose. Hugo observes that each tide is a saw-stroke, slowly reshaping the rocks, and the sea is described again and again as secretive, capricious and stronger than human intention: it advances and retreats, proposes and retracts, and in the end imposes its own result. Danton is rendered as a man-ocean, a human embodiment of the same elemental force. The people, in Hugo’s wider poetic vocabulary, are a rising tide that no ship can permanently resist.

The forests of Brittany serve as a parallel elemental figure for the other side. They are the old country absorbing and sheltering the Whites, the earth’s own conservatism, so that the novel stages two natural forces in contest. But the tide is reserved for the progressive direction. The forest can hide, delay and ambush. It cannot advance.

The metaphor does several things at once, and it is worth separating them. First, it subordinates agency to process. Leaders become greffiers, recording clerks, whose signatures appear on the documents of history while the text is written by a larger force. Second, it naturalises direction. A tide has a predictable, non-arbitrary course even while individual waves are chaotic, and Hugo thereby grants the Revolution a vector, toward the future and toward equality, while conceding its violence and unpredictability in the moment. Third, it relocates moral judgment. One may call the Revolution good or bad depending on whether one faces forward or back, but one cannot treat it as a discretionary human policy, something a cabinet might have chosen otherwise. Fourth, it holds awe and terror together. Across Hugo’s work the ocean is both fascinans and tremendum, attractive and appalling, and in Ninety-Three the tide is creative and destructive, vivifying and devastating. Progress is real, but it does not spare individuals.

None of this amounts to strict determinism, and it would be a mistake to read it so. Hugo still stages the human drama of mercy against justice as a drama, with outcomes that matter. But he places that drama inside a current that individuals cannot reverse. The tide may be delayed or locally deflected; it is not held back. The metaphor is powerful precisely because it is not neutral. It is an interpretation of history that privileges direction over contingency, process over persons, and the future over the past, while still registering, in the tragic close, the human price of the advance. A reader who admires the metaphor should therefore keep one question open throughout: who gets to say which way the tide is running, and from where on the shore are they standing?

Hugo does not entrust the argument to the narrator’s asides alone. He dramatises it through three figures who stand for three possible relations to the tide. The Marquis de Lantenac is the unyielding royalist who returns from exile to lead the Whites, a man of iron courage and iron cruelty who embodies the old order’s stubborn vitality. Gauvain, his own grand-nephew, is the young republican commander, a noble by birth who has crossed over to the Revolution and who is capable of mercy. Cimourdain, Gauvain’s austere tutor, a former priest turned Jacobin, embodies the Revolution’s uncompromising logic: he loves his pupil like a son and will judge him like a stranger.

The set pieces of the novel are built to test them against one another. When Lantenac’s men set fire to the tower of La Tourgue and three small children are trapped inside, the marquis, having escaped, hears a mother’s cry and turns back, surrendering himself to save them. Gauvain, watching his enemy choose the children over his own safety, makes the decision that destroys him: he frees Lantenac and takes his place before the republican court. Cimourdain, who presides over the judgment as the Republic’s commissioner, condemns his pupil in the name of the principle that no mercy may be shown to the Republic’s enemies. When the blade falls, Cimourdain shoots himself.

This is why the book cannot be read as a triumphalist tract. Hugo insists that above the revolutionary absolute stands the human absolute. Lantenac’s sacrifice, in which the representative of cruelty reveals a conscience, and Gauvain’s sacrifice, in which the representative of progress places a single human life above the doctrine’s demand, elevate individual mercy over pure ideological justice. Cimourdain’s suicide is the book’s verdict on principle without pity: a creed that cannot forgive will in the end consume the people who hold it most faithfully. Gauvain’s last vision, on the eve of his execution, is of a freer society, with technological progress, the equality of the sexes and the minimum of government, a republic of the ideal rising above Cimourdain’s republic of the absolute. It aligns with Hugo’s broader faith that the revolutionary impulse regenerates humanity even when its immediate agents are flawed or fanatical.

The qualification, in other words, is built into the structure. The Revolution is Necessity, but the highest moral demand is still humanity. The book acknowledges the barbarity of the Terror while still claiming that a temple of civilisation is being raised beneath the scaffolding of violence. The tide explains why the building goes up; it does not tell anyone what they are permitted to do to each other while it does. This combination of historical optimism and moral insistence is the characteristic Hugo, and it is where the essay’s argument must press hardest. If the tide excused the waves, there would be no tragedy, only weather. That Hugo ends the novel on a double death, rather than a victory march, is his refusal of the excuse.

Hugo’s Brittany is not, strictly, the Vendée, though he treats the western wars as a single dramatic field. The third part of the book is titled “In the Vendée,” even though much of the action takes place around Fougères, in Brittany. Historically the distinction is sharper than the novel lets it be, and it is worth drawing, because the gap between the history and the fiction shows what the fiction is for.

The Guerre de Vendée erupted south of the Loire in March 1793. Its most immediate trigger was the levée en masse, the republic’s call for 300,000 men, laid on top of years of conflict over the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, which had required priests to swear loyalty to the state and split rural France along religious lines. Peasants and local notables formed the Catholic and Royal Army under leaders such as Jacques Cathelineau, Henri de La Rochejaquelein and François de Charette. For a season they controlled large stretches of countryside, fought pitched battles and attempted the disastrous northern expedition known as the Virée de Galerne. The Republic’s repression was ferocious. It culminated in General Turreau’s colonnes infernales, which swept through the region in early 1794, and in the mass drownings at Nantes. Estimates of the dead in the region commonly run from about 170,000 to more than 200,000, a large share of the local population. Some writers have called this a genocide; most professional historians reject the term, while not disputing the scale of the killing. The honest position is that the figures are contested and the suffering is not.

The Chouannerie was a different kind of war. It was the more dispersed guerrilla struggle that developed most fully from 1794 onward in Brittany, Maine and Normandy, relying on small bands, ambushes and local knowledge rather than a standing army. It never held major towns for long and persisted in intermittent form until the early years of the Consulate. Survivors of the Vendée’s northern expedition helped to seed it, and the two movements shared religious and anti-centralising motives, but they differed in scale, organisation and duration.

Hugo collapses much of this into a single moral theatre. Lantenac is both aristocratic commander and the embodiment of the old order’s stubborn vitality, and the forests themselves become an ally of the past. The novel’s famous set pieces, the rescue of the children from the burning tower, Gauvain’s decision to spare Lantenac at the cost of his own life, and Cimourdain’s simultaneous suicide, stage the conflict between revolutionary necessity and human pity. The narrator ultimately sides with the Revolution as the carrier of a larger emancipation, while granting the counter-revolution its dignity and its capacity for individual nobility.

Here the historical record both supports and unsettles the novel. It supports the sense of mutual atrocity: neither side had a monopoly on cruelty, and Hugo’s refusal to give one is accurate. It supports the sense of a contest that was never merely a clash of abstract principles. It was also a war of local worlds against a centralising state that had, by 1793, declared itself the sole legitimate source of authority, which is why Hugo’s opposition of the universal patrie to the particular pays is the sharpest thing in the book. But it unsettles the tide metaphor, because the tide had no use for the peasants of the west except as obstacles. The people who rose in the Vendée were themselves ordinary people, and their grievances, over conscription, over their priests, over the arrogance of distant officials, were not simply the whimpering of the past. A steelman of the counter-revolution would say that the universalism of 1793 was not nearly as universal as it claimed, and that a revolution which kills a hundred thousand peasants in the name of the people has given the word a very particular meaning. Hugo half-concedes the point by making Lantenac capable of greatness. He does not concede that the tide would therefore have been wrong to run.

The test of a universalism is who it leaves out, and here the long record is humbling for Hugo’s confidence. The Revolution proclaimed the rights of man, but Olympe de Gouges, who answered the Declaration in 1791 with a Declaration of the Rights of Woman, went to the guillotine in November 1793. French women did not vote in national elections until 1945, after a decree of 1944, a century and a half after the Revolution that had invoked equality. Slavery is a harder case still. The Convention’s decree abolishing slavery in the colonies, passed in February 1794, followed an emancipation that enslaved people in Saint-Domingue had in large part seized for themselves, and Napoleon restored slavery in 1802. Haiti won its independence in 1804, and France later extracted a ruinous indemnity from it as the price of recognition. French slavery was not finally abolished until 1848.

These facts do not refute Hugo, but they discipline him. They show a tide that ran, stalled, ran back, and ran again; that was driven in each stage by people who refused to be treated as waves, among them the enslaved of Saint-Domingue and the women who organised in Paris. If there is a necessity in this history it is not a gentle gravitational pull. It is something that has to be made to happen, over and over, by those with the most to gain, against those with the most to lose. That is a less comforting reading of Hugo’s metaphor than the one he offers, but it is, I think, the more faithful to the evidence.

The novel’s scaffolding remains useful for later episodes, and it invites an analogy that is tempting and needs to be handled with care: the cultural upheavals of the 1960s, sometimes compared to 1789. Both moments involved a challenge to inherited authority in the name of liberty and equality. The Revolution dismantled feudal privileges, subordinated the Church and proclaimed universal rights. The 1960s, with civil rights, feminism, sexual liberation, anti-war activism and a broader youth culture, attacked racial hierarchy, traditional gender norms and the Cold War’s institutional consensus.

But the analogy is imperfect in a way that matters. The French Revolution was a political seizure of the state accompanied by organised violence on a mass scale. The 1960s operated largely inside existing liberal institutions and worked through courts, legislatures, markets and media. Its durable achievements, the expansion of formal equality and the delegitimation of open discrimination, were real; so were its excesses and unintended consequences. Hugo’s Necessity finds a partial echo in the sense, common among participants and later chroniclers, that certain barriers once broken could not be fully restored. It finds much less support in the claim that the decade was a revolution in the 1793 sense, and a writer who borrows the French vocabulary for it should know how much of the blood has been left out of the comparison.

The conservative and national-populist movements of recent decades can be read, with the same caveats, as forms of counter-revolution. Like the Vendée and the Chouannerie, they defend local or national particularity against what they experience as an overreaching universalism, whether that universalism takes the form of revolutionary centralisation, post-1960s cultural liberalisation or technocratic governance. They emphasise continuity, borders and traditional patterns of life. They are not pure restorations: they use modern electoral systems and media, and they accept much of the economic order that earlier counter-revolutions distrusted. Still, the structural parallel holds, a reactive mobilisation against a prior project of rapid equalisation and homogenisation. Hugo’s Lantenac would recognise the impulse, even if he would not recognise the tools.

It is important to say what this reading does not do. It is an analytical frame, not a verdict on the people inside it, and many who vote for or sympathise with such movements would reject the description, often with reason. Their grievances over deindustrialisation, over the loss of local institutions, over politics conducted at a great distance from the places it lands, are the grievances of the pays, and Hugo, of all writers, would have asked that they be heard. The mistake to avoid is the one that treats the tide as a licence to dismiss the people it passes over.

Hugo’s metaphor raises the further question of whether any political actor can permanently hold the tide back, and recent history offers a useful test case in the career of Donald Trump. Narratives of his permanent political demise after 2020 proved premature, and he returned to the presidency after the 2024 election. That fact does not establish the opposite claim, that populist reaction is itself an irreversible tide. It simply illustrates contingency. Earlier counter-revolutions, the Restoration, the Thermidorian reaction and the various nineteenth-century conservative restorations, constrained or reversed particular revolutionary measures without erasing the longer expansion of formal political rights. Likewise, the cultural and institutional changes of the post-1960s decades have been modified by electoral backlashes without being wholly undone. A wave can rise very high and still be a wave.

The longer historical record supports a qualified version of Hugo’s optimism rather than a strict determinism. Since the late eighteenth century, formal equality of legal and political status has expanded in most societies that developed stable inclusive institutions. The franchise widened, slavery and formal hereditary privilege were abolished, women’s civil and political rights advanced, and explicit racial hierarchies lost legal sanction. Absolute living standards rose even more dramatically. In the early nineteenth century, extreme poverty described the large majority of the world’s population, by the best reconstructions more than four-fifths of it; by the World Bank’s international line it now describes under a tenth, although that line, and the recent stall in progress, are both argued over. Life expectancy has roughly doubled, and literacy has gone from the privilege of a small minority to the possession of a large majority of adults across every region.

Inequality tells a more complicated story. In many Western and Northern European countries, income inequality compressed substantially during the twentieth century before partially rebounding after 1980, the U-shaped pattern associated with Thomas Piketty’s work. Analyses of surplus income, that is, income above a subsistence floor, point to a longer-term decline in the share of transferable resources captured by the top, even where conventional top-income shares look more stable. These are contested measurements, and they should be held loosely.

What cannot be held loosely is how the great equalisations came about. Walter Scheidel’s history of inequality finds that the largest reductions in the long record have repeatedly coincided with shocks: mass-mobilisation war, revolution, state collapse and plague. That is a sobering finding for anyone inclined to take comfort in the tide. It suggests that when equality has advanced fastest it has often done so through catastrophe, which is exactly the thing Hugo was trying to reckon with in 1793, and which his metaphor has a way of softening. Hannah Arendt, in On Revolution, was alert to the way that the language of irresistible streams and necessity entered revolutionary thought and licensed what came after; her wariness is a useful counterweight to Hugo’s grandeur.

These gains have also not been linear. Periods of reaction have regularly followed periods of rapid change. Relative economic inequality has risen again in many places since the late twentieth century. Non-Western societies have followed different trajectories, and the story of Western progress cannot be told without the empires that financed it. Hugo’s Necessity is therefore best read as an interpretive stance and not as a law. The direction of travel in formal status and absolute welfare has been toward broader inclusion in societies that sustained competitive politics and open economies, but the path has been marked by repeated oscillations, and the outcome has always depended on institutions, technology, demography and political choice.

In Australia the oscillation is not an abstraction. In May 1967 more than ninety per cent of voters approved the referendum that removed the Constitution’s exclusions of Aboriginal people from the census and from Commonwealth law-making, one of the most lopsided results in the nation’s history, and the sense that history had turned was widely shared. In 1992 the High Court’s decision in Mabo overturned the fiction of terra nullius, and the political reaction that followed was fierce. In October 2023 the referendum on an Indigenous Voice to Parliament was defeated, nationally by roughly sixty per cent to forty and without a majority in any state. The No vote was not a single movement. It combined conservative opposition with objections from some Indigenous critics that the proposal did not go far enough toward treaty and sovereignty, and it would be a failure of the steelmanning discipline to treat it as simply the forest closing over the clearing.

But the episode shows both halves of Hugo’s picture at once. A tide that carried an overwhelming Yes in 1967 did not carry the Voice in 2023, and nothing in the logic of Necessity could have told anyone in advance which way a referendum would go. At the same time the question the Voice posed, whether a people dispossessed on this continent are to have a standing say in the decisions that govern them, has not gone away, and every attempt to answer it has had to start from the ground that earlier generations cleared. The oscillation is real. So is the ratchet. Neither cancels the other.

Ninety-Three ends with the simultaneous deaths of Gauvain and Cimourdain, the young man of mercy and the old man of absolute justice. The Revolution continues, the human cost is acknowledged, and the forests of the past have not vanished. The novel’s scaffolding still illuminates a pattern. Expansive claims of equality generate resistance. Resistance modifies, but rarely fully reverses, the prior gains in formal rights and material conditions. The resulting equilibrium is higher than the starting point and permanently unstable.

Whether that pattern continues is not settled by any single election or cultural moment, and Hugo’s tide cannot settle it for us. This is the final and perhaps the most useful thing the metaphor teaches, though not in the way its author intended. A tide does not need anyone’s help. Equality has needed a great deal of help: from the enslaved who emancipated themselves, from the women who demanded the vote, from the dispossessed who went on asking, and from the occasional Gauvain who set a single life above the doctrine. Hugo’s Necessity describes, at best, the direction in which that effort has tended to pay off. The effort itself is human, and so is the responsibility for it.

That, I think, is what Hugo meant by placing the human absolute above the revolutionary one. History may be a tide, but the waves are the only part of it that can choose to be merciful. The question that Ninety-Three leaves with us is one of both historical force and of the choices made inside it, and it is a question each generation of waves must answer for itself.

BLAK AND BLACK  |  MEDIA AND ADVOCACY  |  EST. 2010

Leave a Reply